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393 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) that an employee 
going and coming from work is outside 
the scope of his employment. However, 
the District Court of Appeal of Florida 
looked to Sweat v. Allen, 200 So. 348, 350 
(Fla. 1941) in stating that the "applicabil-
ity of the rule depends upon the circum-
stance of the particular employment." The 
court agreed with the commissioner's de-
cision and found that Polite was not "off-
duty away from the employer's premises." 
Id. Further, the court stated that "compen-
sability is almost always awarded when the 
injury occurs while the employee is travel-
ing along a public road between two por-
tionsof the employer's premises", citing 
Larson on Worker's Compensation Law 
§ 15-14(a) (1985). The court's essential 
reasoning for finding an exception to the 
going and coming rule was grounded in 
the fact that Ms. Polite's duties required 
her to be in two different locations within 
the Dade County school system, and the 
travel between the two different work-
places "was an essential part of her em-
ployment.'~ Id. 
The District Court of Appeal of Florida 
examined this case in two steps. First, an 
examination of the compensability of the 
injury found that the encouragement of 
participating in after school activities, 
coupled with the official permission and 
knowledge of such participation by the 
Dade County School System was substan-
tial and competent evidence that the injury 
arose out of and in the course of Polite's 
employment. Second, the findings that 
Polite was not "off-duty" at the time of the 
accident, and that she was traveling the 
only road available allowed the court to ac-
cept the Larson premises exception to the 
"going and coming rule." The importance 
of this Florida court's opinion is its rec-
ognition of the premises exception which 
is present and accepted in a similar form in 
Maryland. 
- Robert L. Kline, III 
Crawley v. General Motors: 
DISPENSING WITH DISABILITY 
IN OCCUPATIONAL DEAFNESS 
CLAIMS 
In Crawley v. General Motors, 70 Md. 
App. 100,519 A.2d 1348 (1987) the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland inter-
preted Md. Ann. Code art. 101, § 25A 
(1985) to mean that a claimant's eligibility 
to receive benefits under workers' com-
pensation for occupational deafness is to 
be determined without regard to the em-
ployee's loss of wages or his ability to per-
form his regular type of work. Prior to this 
interpretation of § 25A, an employee who 
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suffered from a hearing impairment as a 
result of industrial noise had to demon-
strate a loss of wages or an incapacity to 
perform his regular work before being eli-
gible for workers' compensation. By dis-
pensing with this disability requirement, 
the court of special appeals has increased 
the number of claimants who are entitled 
to benefits for occupational deafness. Now, 
a claimant has to suffer only a compensable 
amount of hearing loss before being eligible 
for workers' compensation. 
For over twenty years, Douglas Crawley, 
Sr. had been exposed to industrial noise in 
the assembly division of General Motors 
where he worked. Alleging that he sus-
tained a hearing loss as a result of his con-
tinued exposure to the industrial noise at 
General Motors, Crawley filed a claim 
with the Workers' Compensation Commis-
sion. The Commission determined that 
Crawley had sustained a compensable de-
gree of hearing loss resulting from his em-
ployment and awarded him benefits. 
General Motors appealed to the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City, arguing that a 
"disablement" was necessary before an em-
ployee could be compensated for occupa-
tional deafness. Crawley stipulated that he 
had not suffered any "disablement." Rely-
ing on Belschner v. Anchor Post Prods., 
Inc., 227 Md. 89,175 A.2d419 (1961), the 
circuit court judge reversed the commis-
sion's order of award. 
The claimant in Belschner had been em-
ployed as a saw operator for twelve years 
and as a result of this employment, suf-
fered a compensable amount of hearing 
loss. The claimant, however, was still per-
forming his duties as a saw operator and 
did not lose any wages. The Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland affirmed the Workers' 
Compensation Commission's rejection of 
the claim and held that worker's compen-
sation for an employee's loss of hearing 
was limited by the language of § 22(a): 
Where an employee of an employer 
subject to this article suffers from an 
occupational disease, and is thereby dis-
abled from performing his work in the 
last occupation in which he was injur-
iously exposed to the hazards of such 
disease, and the disease was due to the 
nature of the occupation ... the em-
ployee ... shall be entitled to compen-
sation ... . 
Md. Ann. Code art. 101, § 22(a) (1985) 
(emphasis added). 
The court of appeals in Belschner also 
analyzed the definitions of "occupational 
disease" and "disablement" in reaching its 
conclusion. Section 67(13) defines "occu-
pational disease" as "the event of an em-
ployee's becoming actually incapacitated, 
either temporarily, partially or totally, be-
cause of a disease contracted as the result 
of and in the course of employment." Sec-
tion 67(15) defines "disablement" as "the 
event of an employee's becoming actually 
incapacitated, either partly or totally." 
Citing Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. 
Coody, 278 S.W. 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1926), the court therein held that an em-
ployee is not actually incapacitated within 
the intent of the law if the employee has 
the capacity to continue his regular em-
ployment and receives his usual rate of 
pay. Although Belschner held that disable-
ment was a prerequisite for worker's com-
pensation for occupational deafness, the 
court therein stated, "If there is a need to 
liberalize the law or to change what we 
think it plainly means, that is a legislative, 
not a judicial function." Belschner, 227 
Md. at 95, 175 A.2d at 422. 
In 1967, six years after the Belschner de-
cision, the Maryland General Assembly 
enacted art. 101, § 25A entitled "Occu-
pational deafness." The court of special 
appeals in Crawley was confronted with 
interpreting this section to resolve the dis-
pute. Crawley contended that the legisla-
ture in enacting § 25A was responding to 
the Belschner court's invitation to change 
the law. General Motors, on the other 
hand, contended that the legislature in-
tended the disability requirement of§ 22(a) 
to apply, viewing § 25A as merely estab-
lishing highly technical criteria for mea-
suring occupational deafness. 
The court of special appeals began its 
inquiry of the legislative intent by examin-
ing § 25A itself. "Although the language of 
section 25A does not specifically state 
whether the General Assembly intended to 
eliminate disablement as a precondition of 
recovery for occupational deafness. Never-
theless, section 25A(a) reads 'Occupational 
deafness shall be compensated according 
to the terms and conditions of this sec-
tion.'" Crawley, 70 Md. App. at 106, 519 
A.2d at 1351 (emphasis in original). Con-
cluding that the language of the section is 
ambiguous and not clearly revealing the 
legislative intent, the court examined the 
legislative history of the section. 
After examining the legislative history 
of § 25A, the court concluded that the leg-
islature not only intended to provide tech-
nical criteria for measuring loss of hearing 
but also intended to make occupational 
deafness compensable regardless of an em-
ployee's inability to work or loss of wages. 
In reaching such a conclusion, the court 
found the language of§ 25A(c) significant. 
"By providing that a hearing loss of 15 
decibels or less shall not constitute a com-
pensable disability, the language employed 
by the Legislature implies that a hearing 
loss in excess of 15 decibels was intended 
to be a compensable disability." Id. at 
107, 519 A.2d at 1352 (emphasis in orig-
inal). 
Now, a "disability" for occupational 
deafness claims is merely a loss of hearing 
in excess of 15 decibels as calculated in ac-
cordance with § 25A. An employee no 
longer has to suffer loss of wages or be un-
able to perform his regular type of work. 
In dissenting, Judge Garrity stated that 
the majority's interpretation of § 25A is 
unreasonable and contrary to public policy. 
"The very raison d'etre for providing work-
men's compensation in the wake of con-
tracting an occupational disease or disorder 
is to restore to a worker that portion of 
lost wages due to the physical disability 
caused by that occupation." Id. at 109,519 
A.2d at 1353. Judge Garity felt that the 
intent of § 25A is to provide the much 
needed technical criteria for measuring oc-
cupational deafness and to provide a qual-
ifying standard of 15 decibels as calculated 
in the section for determining compen-
sability. 
While it is difficult to determine the 
ramifications of the majority's interpreta-
tion of § 25A, the decision permits em-
ployees who suffer a compensable amount 
of hearing loss to be eligible for worker's 
compensation while continuing to draw full 
wages. This decision suggests that it is the 
deafness and not the disability that is to be 
compensated. 
- Randolph C. Baker 
Hughes v. Workmen's Compensation 
Appeals Board: PAYMENT OF 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS UNDER CONCURRENT 
EMPLOYMENT. 
In 1979 a Pennsylvania Workers' Com-
pensation referee awarded death benefits 
based upon his conclusion that, for the 
purposes of wage computation, a private 
corporation and the federal government 
were concurrent employers of the decedent 
under the Pennsylvania Worker's Com-
pensation Act (hereinafter "Act"). The 
referee's decision was subsequently re-
versed by the Worker's Compensation 
Board (hereinafter "Board") which ruled 
that the federal government was not an 
"employer" within the meaning of the Act. 
In Hughes v. Workmen's CompensationAp-
peals Board, __ Pa. Commw. __ ,513 
A.2d 576 (1986), the claimant, Rebecca 
Lane Hughes, sought a judicial interpreta-
tion of the word "employer" as it is used in 
the Act. 
David George Hughes died on July 3, 
1977, from injuries sustained in an auto-
mobile accident that occurred while he 
was operating a vehicle for his employer, 
Salem Transportation Co. He was survived 
by his wife (hereinafter "claimant") and a 
minor daughter. 
Claimant was granted death benefits on 
July 18, 1979 based on the referee's find-
ings that, at the time of his death, Hughes 
was not only employed by Salem, but was 
also a member of the United States Navy 
and on active duty. Thus, Hughes was an 
employee of both the federal government 
and a private corporation. The referee con-
sidered the earnings from both employers 
in computiI1g wages for the purpose of de-
termining the proper compensation due 
Hughes' survivors. Id. at __ , 513 A.2d 
at 577. 
The referee's decision was based upon 
Section 309(e) of the Pennsylvania Work-
men's Compensation Act, Act of June 2, 
1915, P.L. 736 as amended, 77 P.S. § 582(e) 
which establishes a requirement "[t]hat 
when an injured employee is concurrently 
working under contracts with two or more 
employers, his wages from all of such em-
ployers shall be considered as if earned 
from the employer liable for compensation 
under the Act." 
The Board reversed, determining that 
the federal government was not an em-
ployer of Hughes and determined com-
pensation solely on Hughes' earnings with 
Salem. In reaching such a decision, the 
Board relied on Pennsylvania Nat'l Guard 
v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. 
and David H. Greenwood, 63 Pa. Cornmw. 
Ct. 1,437 A.2d 494 (1981). However, this 
case was of little significance to Hughes 
since it dealt with a member of the Penn-
sylvania National Guard who was injured 
while participating in an annual training 
program. The claimant, Greenwood filed 
a worker's compensation claim which was 
denied by the referee and subsequently re-
versed by the Board, thereby granting 
worker's compensation benefits. The Penn-
sylvania Commonwealth Court, citing lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction by the Work-
er's Compensation Board, vacated the 
order. 
The Board's reliance on Pennsylvania 
Nat'l Guard ignored the issue at hand: 
"[ w ]hether the federal government was the 
decedent's employer for the purpose of 
computing the amount of compensation to 
be awarded to his survivors and paid by 
Salem pursuant to section 309(e), 77 P.S. 
§ 582(e)." Pennsylvania Nat'l Guard dealt 
neither with amount of compensation nor 
with concurrent employers. Id. 
In addition, the employer (Salem) and 
the Board contended that the word "em-
ployer" pursuant to Section 103, 77 P.S. 
§ 21 did not include the federal govern-
ment. Salem argued that the absence of 
specifically naming the federal government 
in the statute provided evidence of an in-
tention to exclude the federal government 
from enjoying employer status. The Penn-
sylvania Commonwealth Court interpreted 
this silence to mean: 
[t]hat the obligations imposed on em-
ployers and the rights conferred upon 
workers by the Act are not to apply 
to the federal government or its em-
ployees. But Section 309(e), 77 P.S. 
§ 582(e), imposes no obligation what-
soever upon an employer other than 
an employer for whom the injured em-
ployee was working, which in this case 
was Salem, not the federal govern-
ment. 
Hence, while the federal government could 
not be an employer for purposes of regula-
tion or subjection to the Act, it was never-
theless a concurrent employer for purposes 
of determining compensation due survivors, 
paid by Salem (the liable employer). It was 
the intention of the Pennsylvania Legisla-
ture to broaden the definition of employer 
under the Act so as to "[ c lover as many em-
ployment relationships in Pennsylvania as 
possible." Giannuzzi v. Donninger Metal 
Prods., 585 F. Supp. 1306, 1309 (W.D. 
Pa. 1984). 
Finally, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth 
Court denied Salem's request for a "set off" 
(reducing Salem's payments to claimant 
by the amount of federal compensation 
available to claimant). There existed no 
evidence to show that the claimant was re-
ceiving federal compensation. Therefore, 
a set off was not warranted. 
The consequences of the Hughes deci-
sion are to maintain liability on the pri-
mary employer for whom the employee 
was aCtually working when injured, while 
preserving claimant's benefits and wages 
from the secondary employer (the federal 
government). 
Section 309(e) poses a heavy burden on 
the private employer since the private em-
ployer not only assumes sole liability but it 
also provides no methods of decreasing 
that liability. 
-Pablo Emilio Lense 
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